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The Role of the Ninth Circuit in the Development of the
Law of Attempt to Monopolize
DanielJ. Gifford*
The attempt clause' of the Sherman Antitrust Act deals with
unilateral behavior which produces or is likely to produce signifi-
cant anticompetitive consequences. Justice Holmes, in his classic
statement of the attempt offense in Swift & Co. v. United States,2 iden-
tified the elements of the offense as the defendant's intent to mo-
nopolize and the dangerous probability that the defendant would
succeed. In the classic model of the offense, the defendant's intent
resolves the ambiguity of the defendant's present behavior by
showing that it is instrumental to the forbidden goal of monop-
olization.
The Ninth Circuit has never been reticent when expressing
opinions about matters of antitrust law. Twenty-two years ago the
Circuit contributed its opinion in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co. 3 to the
corpus of antitrust law. The decision simplified the bringing of at-
tempt to monopolize cases and has long symbolized an expansion-
ary approach to the interpretation of the attempt clause.4 Lessig has
had a profound and unsettling effect on section 2 actions and the
impact of the decision is still being felt. Lessig gave rise to the so-
called "double-inference" method of proving an attempt violation.
The opinion also provided support for construing the section 2 at-
tempt clause as a residual prohibition of anticompetitive behavior
which is not covered by other provisions of the antitrust laws.
More recently, in Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp. ,5 a
panel of the Ninth Circuit, following in the footsteps of Lessig,
strongly reasserted an expansionary view of the attempt clause on
the explicit ground that the Sherman Act needed such a residual
prohibition. Yet other less expansionary strains can also be found
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; A.B., 1953, Holy Cross College; LL.B.,
1958, Harvard University; J.S.D., 1981, Columbia University.
1 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
2 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
3 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
4 See, e.g., Handler, Reforming the Antitnst Laws, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1287, 1352 (1982);
Kaye, Attempt to Monopolize in the Ninth Circuit: The Legacy of Lessig, 12 WILLAMETrE LJ. 331
(1976); Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionaly Answer to the Prophylactic
Riddle of Section Two, 72 MicH. L. REV. 373, 419 (1974); Blecher, Attempt to Monopolize Under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act: "Dangerous Probability" of Monopolization Iithin the "Relevant Alar-
ket," 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215, 216 (1969).
5 559 F.2d 488, 504 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
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in the Ninth Circuit's case law on the attempt clause. Some early
decisions of that court had openly expressed disagreement with Les-
sig while other decisions had tamed and qualified it.6
This article is an interpretation and evaluation of the Ninth
Circuit's work on attempt. It traces, in broad outline, that court's
approach to the attempt clause from Lessig in 1964 through the
complexities of the case law of the 1970s to the present.
This article will argue that at least one aspect of the Lessig deci-
sion has been turned on its head into a constraint on plaintiffs,
helping to discourage the bringing of nonmeritorious attempt
claims. 7 The article will also argue that the series of predatory pric-
ing cases which have come before the Ninth Circuit, beginning with
Hanson v. Shell Oil Co. 8 in 1976, have ultimately exerted a profound
effect, not just upon the disposition of predatory pricing claims, but
upon the law of attempt generally. This impact has been a con-
servative one, which has provided basic guidelines for evaluating
attempt claims and has helped to integrate the law of attempt into
antitrust law generally. In the process, the cases have rationalized
attempt law both in an economic sense and in the sense of fitting
the attempt clause into a coherent place in relation to section 1 and
the monopolization clause of section 2. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking
Co. 9 has exerted a major effect on the interpretation of the attempt
offense, although in a direction more consistent with the legitimate
purposes of that clause than the earlier decisions in Lessig and
Greyhound.
I. The Attempt Clause and the Ninth Circuit's Decisional Law
A. The Ninth Circuit's Case Law on Attempt
The Ninth Circuit's various struggles with the role of the at-
tempt clause of section 2 reflect the profound changes which have
overtaken antitrust law in the period since Lessig was decided. In-
deed, that Circuit's struggles with Lessig's significance and with the
role of the attempt clause in the Sherman Act schema ultimately
paved the way for a more mature and judicially responsible attitude
towards the attempt offense.
The Ninth Circuit's troubles with the attempt offense devel-
6 See, e.g., Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972);
Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049 (1972). See also Part II, sections C and D infa.
7 See Part V infra for an assessment of William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Conti-
nental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
8 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976).
9 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
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oped partly from the court's willingness, in defining that offense, to
tolerate ambiguity about the defendant's goal and, therefore, about
the intent accompanying the defendant's behavior. If the defend-
ant's goal is something other than the acquisition of market power,
then the defendant's specific intent, to the extent that it is revealed,
will necessarily be an intent to achieve some objective other than
market power. The court's toleration of ambiguity concerning the
defendant's goal and intent necessarily have fostered considerable
uncertainty about the parameters of the offense. Intent cannot be
used as a criterion with which to resolve ambiguity about the lawful-
ness of the defendant's behavior when the criterion itself is open-
ended.
The Ninth Circuit has also been plagued repeatedly by its ex-
pressed willingness to allow an attempt claim to rest upon infer-
ences from the defendant's behavior, even absent proof of the
defendant's market power. That approach has been a mistake and
has subjected the court and numerous defendants to the scourge of
forced participation in unmeritorious litigation.
B. The Judicial Process Illustrated by the Ninth Circuit
1. Institutional Constraints on Coherent Decisionmaking
The Ninth Circuit became enmeshed in complex and contra-
dictory decisional law because, as a court, it lacked a coherent view
of the attempt clause. This lack of understanding was compounded
by the fact that the membership of the panels which decided at-
tempt cases over the years varied from case to case. Each panel
approached the construction of the attempt clause in a slightly dif-
ferent way, and yet each panel was bound to reconcile its own deci-
sion with earlier precedents. The result was a body of decisional
law which was unnecessarily complicated and which engendered
widespread uncertainty about how the law would be applied.
Over the years, the Ninth Circuit tried to write new content
into the attempt clause without any clear vision of its objectives or
of the evaluative criteria which it would employ in deciding attempt
cases. The court tried to dispense with proof of the defendant's
market power by permitting attempt cases to be based upon sets of
inferences drawn from the defendant's behavior. The validity of
this approach depended upon whether unilateral behavior by a firm
without market power could ever produce significant anticompeti-
tive effects. Yet for years the court failed to inquire seriously into
the actual or potential effects of such behavior.
The Ninth Circuit's law of attempt began to develop in a coher-
ent fashion only after two scholars developed a thorough analysis of
19861 1023
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predatory pricing which the court found useful.1o The intellectual
power of this predatory pricing analysis carried over into attempt
analysis generally, providing the court with the conceptual frame-
work it needed for deciding all attempt cases.
The Ninth Circuit's struggle with its own attempt to monopo-
lize case law illustrates something about the judicial process. Cases
arise one at a time, and a court necessarily looks at a problem in the
context of a particular case. Although there are many advantages to
this narrow and concrete focus, it does not facilitate the develop-
ment of the kind of understanding of a multi-faceted issue that
comes from a broad overview and a thorough examination of the
ramifications of its resolution in differing contexts." A broad issue
whose resolution requires extensive and careful analysis is not eas-
ily handled by the judiciary whose tasks require it to decide large
numbers of dissimilar cases with relative speed. This is particularly
true when the ideal resolution of that broad issue involves selecting
a set of relatively stable decisional criteria which can be used re-
peatedly over a sustained period.' 2
2. A Regulatory Agency Analogue
The Ninth Circuit's experience in handling attempt to monop-
olize cases is similar to the experience attributed to regulatory
agencies as they have proceeded through their life cycles.' 3 In a
regulatory agency's early years, it acts confidently and coherently,
because the problems which it has to remedy have been fairly well
delineated in the legislation establishing the agency, the legislative
hearings, and in the various committee reports. The agency knows
where it is going, and that knowledge guides its decisions. Later in
its life cycle, when the original problems have been solved or have
changed their configuration, the agency can no longer look to the
statute and its legislative history for guidance. The agency then be-
gins to flounder. It has no clearly defined objectives and it loses
direction.
When the Ninth Circuit decided to rewrite the law of attempt
to monopolize, it put itself into a position like that of a regulatory
agency late in its life cycle. The court set itself adrift from older
precedent with no coherent idea of where it wanted to go. It
10 See note 14 infra.
11 See Gifford, Discretionary Decisionmaking in the Regulatory Agencies: A Conceptual Frame-
work, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 101 (1983).
12 See, e.g., Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786,
799, 815 (1967).
13 See M. BERSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 74-102 (1955).
See also Gifford, The New Deal Regulator
, 
Model: A History of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 MINN.
L. REV. 299, 314 (1983).
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neither analyzed nor carefully delineated its objectives. The court
had no vision and hence began to flounder. It was rescued only
when it adopted a vision broad enough to provide it with guidance
from one case to the next. The vision was one which the court was
not institutionally equipped to create for itself. Fortunately, schol-
ars developed an appropriate vision and a supporting analytical
framework,'4 and the court possessed the insight and receptivity to
accept them.
II. An Expansionary Approach to the Attempt Clause: Filling a
"Gap" in the Sherman Act from Lessig to Greyhound
A. Lessig's Expansionary Approach to the Attempt Clause
Until the Ninth Circuit decided Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co. 15 in
1964, it was generally understood that in order to state a claim for
attempted monopolization, the plaintiff had to prove that the de-
fendant possessed a "specific intent" to monopolize and that there
was a "dangerous probability" the defendant might succeed in
achieving the intended objective. Justice Holmes had set forth
these elements of the plaintiff's case early in the century in his
opinion in Swift & Co. v. United States.1 These two elements, which
had been universally followed, presupposed a third element: a rele-
vant market, since both the defendant's intent to monopolize and
the dangerous probability of the defendant's success implied the
existence of a market.
In Lessig, however, the Ninth Circuit eliminated both proof of
"dangerous probability of success" and proof of a relevant market
as necessary elements of the plaintiff's case. According to the deci-
sion in that case, the plaintiff needed only to prove the defendant's
''specific intent" to monopolize in order to establish an attempt to
monopolize case.
The Lessig case involved various antitrust claims by a former
lessee and operator of a Tidewater gasoline station against his sup-
14 The reference is to Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). Their analysis has been used exten-
sively by the Ninth Circuit. See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377,
1384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d
870, 887 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1085 (1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking
Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1031-39 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 742-43 (9th
Cir. 1979); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 855-59 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358-59
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); notes 75-80 infra and accompanying text.
See also Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184, 1193 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1184 (1985); Marsann Co. v. Brammall, Inc., 788 F.2d 611, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1986).
15 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
16 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
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plier. Among them was the claim that Tidewater had attempted to
monopolize by a series of steps designed to set its dealers' resale
price for gasoline and by excluding other suppliers from those sta-
tions through a system of exclusive dealing contracts and tying ar-
rangements. 17 In reversing the judgment for the defendant, the
Ninth Circuit ruled, inter alia, that the lower court had improperly
withdrawn the attempt to monopolize claim from the jury. The
court stated:
We reject the premise that probability of actual monopolization
is an essential element of proof of attempt to monopolize. Of
course, such a probability may be relevant circumstantial evi-
dence of intent, but the specific intent itself is the only evidence
of dangerous probability that the statute requires-perhaps on
the not unreasonable assumption that the actor is better able
than others to judge the practical possibility of achieving his ille-
gal objective. When the charge is attempt (or conspiracy) to
monopolize, rather than monopolization, the relevant market is
"not in issue."' 18
When Lessig was first decided, many observers viewed it as an
unwarranted rewriting of the attempt offense. Moreover, the Lessig
opinion seemed to be self contradictory. How could a defendant
possess a specific intent to monopolize if that intent was not related
to a market? If it was related to a market but that market need not
be established by proof, then a defendant could be liable for in-
tending to monopolize a sphere of activity which did not constitute
an actual market. That was indeed what the court said when it re-
lated the defendant's intent to "an appreciable segment" of sales of
petroleum products.
By eliminating the requirements of proving "dangerous prob-
ability of success" and a "relevant market," the Lessig court took a
highly expansionary approach to the attempt offense. The court
believed that it was possible for a defendant to attempt to monopo-
lize a "part" of interstate commerce which did not necessarily cor-
respond to a relevant market.' 9 Moreover, the conduct in Lessig
17 327 F.2d at 463.
18 Id. at 474 (citation omitted). The court continued:
Section 2 prohibits attempts to monopolize 'any part' of commerce, and a domi-
nant position in the business of distributing petroleum products and TBA was not
necessarily prerequisite to ability to attempt to monopolize an appreciable seg-
ment of interstate sales in such products. If thejury found that Tidewater intended
to fix the price at which 2,700 independent service station operators resold gaso-
line, and to exclude other suppliers of petroleum products and sponsored TBA
items from competing for the patronage of these operators, and took steps to ac-
complish that purpose, it could properly conclude that Tidewater attempted to
monopolize a part of interstate commerce in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
Id. at 474-75.
19 Id. at 475.
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which gave rise to the attempt to monopolize claim was Tidewater's
exclusion of rival firms from selling to its franchised dealers and its
attempt to fix its dealers' resale prices. The "part" of commerce
which Tidewater attempted to monopolize thus was the retail distri-
bution of its own brand of gasoline, a part of commerce which
could not have been monopolized in an economic sense. More-
over, Tidewater's offenses involved the exertion of vertical control
over the distribution of its product, control which again can rarely
increase the seller's market power.
B. The Obscurity of the Lessig Opinion
The Lessig opinion was written in almost delphic language.
The court explicitly dispensed with the need for independent proof
of a "dangerous probability of success" and of a relevant market
and said that "the specific intent itself is the only evidence of dan-
gerous probability the statute requires." 20 The language suggests
that a plaintiff could prove an attempt case solely by proving spe-
cific intent to monopolize. Indeed, since the court related the at-
tempt not to a relevant market, but to an "appreciable segment" of
commerce, its words suggest that an intent to supply many custom-
ers could be an attempt to monopolize. That reading of the court's
opinion underlay Tidewater's petition for rehearing. In its petition,
Tidewater asserted that the court's opinion on attempt could be
read as rendering illegal any competitive effort to gain a share of
available business. 21
Despite the apparent sweep of the Lessig opinion, the evidence
which was before the court undercut the breadth of its language.
That evidence consisted of Tidewater's use of requirements con-
tracts and tying arrangements to exclude other suppliers from
Tidewater dealerships and price fixing activities with regard to
those dealerships. The court held that the requirements contracts
and tying arrangements violated both section 1 of the Sherman Act
and section 3 of the Clayton Act, while the price fixing violated sec-
tion 1. The court thus ruled that Tidewater's attempt violation
could be established by a showing of behavior which violated sec-
tion 1 and section 3. A contemporary critic might have asked
whether the Lessig case was an appropriate setting in which to an-
nounce an apparently revolutionary new interpretation of the at-
tempt clause, since nothing turned upon Tidewater's section 2 -
liability. Indeed, for reasons set forth below, a contemporary critic
might well have asked whether the sweeping language of the Lessig
20 Id. at 474.
21 Id. at 478.
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opinion was misleading and if it had indeed announced the novel
attempt doctrine which was being widely attributed to it.
The court appears to have written its opinion in a way designed
to encourage disparate readings. In the body of its opinion, the
court employed the apparently expansionary language previously
quoted, 22 emphasizing the importance of specific intent and the dis-
pensibility of evidence on dangerous probability and the relevant
market. However, the court may have significantly qualified these
generalizations in accompanying footnotes. Although these foot-
notes are not models of clarity, the court seemed to be suggesting
that its remand was premised on the ground that violations of sec-
tion 1 (or at least per se violations of section 1) constituted viola-
tions of section 2.23
C. The Significance of Lessig as Precedent
As precedent, Lessig has had a spotty history. In 1970, the
Ninth Circuit was saying, in Industrial Building Materials, Inc. v. Inter-
chemical Corp. ,24 that under the Lessig precedent, a former distribu-
tor suing its former supplier for attempt need not prove the
existence of a relevant market.2 5 Yet it made that statement in a
context in which the plaintiff was alleging that the supplier held
"monopoly power" in its industry and, alternatively, that the sup-
plier's branded line of products was itself a relevant market. In that
case, the supplier had integrated forward and had taken the distrib-
utor's customers away, allegedly by various unfair tactics. 26 The
court had trouble in both excusing the plaintiff from proving a rele-
vant market and still describing the admittedly required specific in-
tent element of the attempt case. In its descriptions, the court
always related that intent to an identified market. The following
year another Ninth Circuit panel restated the requirements of an
attempt case as if Lessig had never been decided. 27
22 See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
23 See 327 F.2d at 474 n.44, 475 n.49. In note 44, the court stated that a contract,
combination, or conspiracy to fix prices, or to exclude competition from a substantial part
of the market violates both § 1 and § 2. It then quoted Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911) for the proposition that § 2 embraces all attempts to achieve objec-
tives forbidden by the first section. In note 49, the court referred to per se violations of § 1.
24 437 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1970).
25 Id. at 1344.
26 Id. at 1341. The allegedly "unfair" means apparently consisted of the supplier's hir-
ing away the distributor's "top salesman" and undercutting the distributor's prices. Id. at
1337, 1342.
27 See Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972). In a preliminary version of its opinion, the panel questioned
the validity of Lessig, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73, 620, at 90,563 n.1. See Cooper, Attempts
and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72
MicH. L. REv. 373, 420-21 n.170 (1974).
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The ramifications of the most expansive reading of Lessig as
precedent forced an explicit qualification of that case in Bushie v.
Stenocord Corp. ,28 a case brought by a distributor of dictating ma-
chines who had been terminated by his supplier when the supplier
decided to integrate forward to perform the distribution function
itself. Under the most expansive reading of Lessig, the defendant's
intent to exclude rivals from an appreciable segment of commerce
would be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of attempt to mo-
nopolize. Taking the Ninth Circuit at its word, Bushie (the termi-
nated distributor) claimed that its supplier, Stenocord, was
attempting to monopolize the retail market for Stenocord dictating
machines in Phoenix, Arizona. Retreating markedly from Lessig, the
Ninth Circuit rejected Bushie's claim on the ground that there was
no " 'dangerous probability' of monopolization . . .in a properly
defined market," 29 since normally a single brand cannot constitute
a relevant market. The two previously discarded elements of dan-
gerous probability of success and relevant market reappeared in the
court's analysis of attempted monopolization because the facts of
Bushie brought home with a vengeance some of the sweeping ramifi-
cations of Lessig's approach to the attempt offense. Stenocord un-
doubtedly intended to take over all of the retail distribution of its
product in Phoenix. If the retail distribution of Stenocord ma-
chines in Phoenix was an "appreciable segment" of commerce, the
intent requirements of Lessig were fulfilled. Under such an approach
to specific intent, therefore, every manufacturer or supplier of any
size would be in jeopardy of violating the attempt clause when it
integrated forward into distribution.
The court's decision in Bushie was ordained by common sense.
A manufacturer decides to replace independent distributors with
branch distributors in order to obtain a more effective distribution
system, the ultimate effect of which is to further competitive goals.
Bushie's result was also mandated by the Ninth Circuit's prior deci-
sion in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd. ,s in which the court ruled that a supplier's agreement with a
potential distributor to replace the supplier's existing distributor
was almost always a reasonable one.31 Hawaiian Oke was a leading
precedent for the lawfulness of such agreements under section 1,
and hence that a supplier's control of its distribution system is gen-
erally consistent with competitive goals. An application of Lessig to
hold Stenocord liable in the Bushie case would have made a manu-
facturer's exercise of ultimate control over its distribution system
28 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972).
29 Id. at 121.
30 416 F.2d 71 (9th Gir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
31 Id. at 78.
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illegal under section 2, a result which would have conflicted with
the premises underlying Hawaiian Oke.
D. The Transmutation of Lessig
In the cases following Bushie, the court confined Lessig's dispen-
sation with proof of dangerous probability and relevant market to
situations in which the attempt claim was "founded upon a substan-
tial claim of restraint of trade."3 2 In Hallmark Industry v. Reynolds
Metals Co. ,3 decided the year after Bushie, the court used that
phrase to describe a case in which there was an intent "to set prices
or exclude competition in a portion of the market without legiti-
mate business purpose," and in which that intent was corroborated
by proof of "predatory" conduct directed to that end.34 Later
panels of the Ninth Circuit employed that same ambiguous phrase
to mean that an attempt claim could be founded upon any violation
of section 1. This approach to the attempt clause finally mutated
into one under which an attempt violation could be established
without proof of a relevant market or dangerous probability, if it
were founded upon a per se violation of section 1 or upon "an-
ticompetitive or predatory" conduct.
This last variation describes the so-called "double inference"
method of proving an attempt case. Under this short-cut method,
the Ninth Circuit requires only proof of "anticompetitive or preda-
tory" conduct to establish a prima facie case of attempt. From
proof of that conduct, the trier of fact is permitted to infer specific
intent to monopolize; and from the specific intent to monopolize so
established, the trier of fact is permitted to draw the further infer-
ence of dangerous probability of success. Drawing the latter infer-
ence completes the case.
The double inference method of proving an attempt to mo-
nopolize case eases the plaintiff's burden substantially. The double
inference method of proof can be found in a narrow reading of the
Lessig opinion: the reading in which the sweeping language of the
text is taken to be qualified by the footnote references to underly-
ing violations of section 1. A violation of section 1 shows the
attempt.
Lessig, therefore, turns out not to be a case that allows a plain-
tiff to prove an attempted monopolization by evidence of an impre-
cisely defined intent alone, as its text superficially implied. Rather,
Lessig has become a major support for proof of an attempt case by
32 That phrase was used in Bushie in distinguishing Lessig and Industrial Building Materi-
als. 460 F.2d at 121.
33 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
34 Id. at 12.
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evidence of conduct. Intent becomes merely a fiction, and it is the
"anticompetitive or predatory" character of the defendant's con-
duct which is the short-cut method for proving an attempt case.
This double inference method of proof could itself constitute a ma-
jor route to an expansionary application of the attempt clause.
Such an application would, however, depend upon the circum-
stances in which use of the double inference method of proof is
permitted. Further ramifications of this approach are explored in
Part III below.
E. Greyhound as the Successor to Lessig
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the broad approach it
had taken to attempted monopolization in the text of the Lessig
opinion in Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp. 35 This time the
court explicitly set forth its rationale for dispensing with the ele-
ments of dangerous probability of success and relevant market:
If proof of an economic market, technically defined, and proof
of a dangerous probability of monopolization of such a market
were made essential elements of an attempt to monopolize, as a
practical matter the attempt offense would cease to have in-
dependent significance. A single firm that did not control some-
thing close to 50 percent of the entire market.., would be free
to indulge in any activity however unreasonable, predatory, or
destructive of competition and without business justification.3 6
In Greyhound, the court's approach to the attempt clause was
based upon a careful analysis of the structure of section 2 of the
Sherman Act and upon a reasoned assessment of the place of the
attempt clause within the structure of the entire Sherman Act.
Although the Lessig decision may have been based on such an analy-
sis, 3 7 the court did not explicitly set forth such analysis in that
opinion.
The Ninth Circuit's approach in Greyhound was explicitly influ-
35 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978).
36 Id. at 504.
37 In Lessig, the court pointed out that § 2 prohibits attempts to monopolize "any part"
of commerce and equated a "part" of commerce with "an appreciable segment" of inter-
state sales in petroleum products. 327 F.2d at 474-75. Although § 2's prohibition of mo-
nopolization is also stated in terms of the monopolization of a "part" of commerce (under
the case law, monopolization of a "part" of commerce means the monopolization of a rele-
vant market), the court may have thought that the different kinds of intent attributable to
the attempt and monopolization offenses provided a basis for differentiating the meaning of
"part" of commerce for the two offenses. Because specific intent was not a necessary ele-
ment of the monopolization offense, the court had a basis for defining that offense in objec-
tive terms that included proof of an economic market. Conversely, because specific intent
was an element of the attempt offense, there was more room for leaving the definition of
the affected "part" of commerce to the defendant itself. See also text accompanying notes
38-42 infra.
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enced by its opinion two years earlier in Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v.
Charles 0. Finley & Co. 38 In that case, the court (harkening back to
judge Hand's musings in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 39 )
indicated that a fifty percent market share was probably insufficient
to support a case of monopolization. 40 The court broadened the
coverage of the attempt clause in order to close the gap which
would otherwise exist in the Sherman Act's coverage of anticompe-
titive behavior. In the court's view, unless the attempt clause was
read expansively, the Act would not cover anticompetitive conduct
unilaterally performed by a firm with a small market share. This
approach was reinforced by the court's belief that a nonexpansion-
ary reading of the attempt clause would make it redundant. If
proof of market power was essential to establishing both attempt
and the completed offense of monopolization, then the question
arose as to what the attempt clause covered that was not also cov-
ered by the monopolization clause. Decisions such as United States
v. Griffith41 suggested that a firm using the power arising from a
large market share against its competitors might be guilty of the
completed offense of monopolization. Such an approach would
leave the attempt clause, in the court's words, without "independ-
ent significance." 42 This redundancy could be avoided, however, if
the attempt clause were given the apparently useful role of prohib-
iting anticompetitive behavior by firms with market shares too small
to fall under the monopolization clause.
Greyhound's reaffirmation of the Lessig approach, however, was
almost immediately qualified. In the year following its decision in
Greyhound, the court decided Gough v. Rossmoor Corp. 43 In Gough, the
court first restated the elements of the attempt offense as specific
intent, "predatory or anticompetitive conduct directed to accom-
plishing the unlawful purpose," and dangerous probability of suc-
cess.44 Although Gough endorsed the so-called "double inference"
method of proving the offense, it expressly limited the expansion-
ary construction of the attempt clause contained in Greyhound.
In Gough, an independent carpet dealer (Rosen) had been de-
nied advertising space in a newspaper for residents of a cooperative
housing development for retired adults. Rosen thus suffered a dis-
advantage in his efforts to compete with a carpet dealer (Crestmark)
situated within the housing development grounds. Rosen sued,
38 512 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1975).
39 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
40 512 F.2d at 1274.
41 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
42 Greyhound, 559 F.2d at 504.
43 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979).
44 Id. at 390.
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claiming violations of section 1 and the attempt to monopolize
clause of section 2 of the Sherman Act, and won a jury verdict. The
Ninth Circuit set aside the judgment entered on that verdict on the
ground that Rosen could not establish a relevant market based on
the evidence. Although the court acknowledged that, under Lessig,
in an attempt case "the relevant market is 'not in issue,' "45 it re-
stricted the application of Lessig's dispensation of proof of a rele-
vant market and retracted much of the expansionary language
which it had employed in Greyhound:
[I]n the absense of proof of relevant market and market power,
the plaintiff must prove either predatory conduct or a per se vio-
lation of section 1 to prove an attempt to monopolize. Without
these limitations the door to a section 2 attempt would be open
far wider than necessary to meet the concerns expressed by this
court in Greyhound Computer... and could permit treble damage
recovery where no remote possibility of monopolization would
appear to exist and where the impact on competition of the con-
duct in question is limited to its impact on the plaintiff.46
Although Gough placed sharp limits on the expansionary approach
to the attempt clause which the court had taken in Greyhound, the
opinion was not free from ambiguities. In Gough, the court con-
ceded in principle that the concerns about the attempt clause ex-
pressed in Greyhound were valid ones; its differences with the
Greyhound opinion were expressed in terms of the extent to which
the scope of the attempt clause should be enlarged. Additionally,
the court in Gough reaffirmed the Lessig ruling that proof of danger-
ous probability of success could be inferred from proof of specific
intent.47
III. The Evolution of a Conduct Requirement and the Double
Inference Method of Proof
A. Conduct Giving Rise to an Inference of Specific Intent
In retrospect, Lessig's principal significance for an expansion-
ary approach to the attempt clause was not to facilitate the bringing
of attempt claims by permitting proof of specific intent alone to
substitute for proof of the other traditional elements of the offense.
Rather, Lessig's expansionary significance was as a precedent for
dispensing with proof of specific intent itself. Under the Lessig ap-
proach, an attempt case could be established by proving anticom-
petitive conduct. Using the double inference method of proof,
proof of anticompetitive conduct permitted the court to draw an
45 Id. (quoting Lessig, 327 F.2d at 474).
46 Id.
47 Id.
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inference of specific intent; and this intent so established then per-
mitted the court to draw an inference of dangerous probability of
successful monopolization. Thus, the only element which a plaintiff
had to prove under this short-cut method was anticompetitive con-
duct. The definition of anticompetitive conduct, therefore, became
the crucial focus of this line of development under Lessig.
In Lessig itself, the court permitted an inference of specific in-
tent and then of dangerous probability of success to be drawn from
conduct which constituted a violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act. Later cases explained Lessig as
holding that proof of a relevant market and dangerous probability
of success could be dispensed with when the plaintiff's attempt
claim was premised upon "a substantial claim of restraint of
trade," 48 a phrase whose meaning has evolved significantly over
time.
In 1973, the Hallmark court used that phrase to describe Lessig
as having involved a claim of intended price setting or exclusion of
competitors from a portion of the market. Hallmark reaffirmed the
legitimacy of the double inference method of proof, holding that
since specific intent is difficult to prove, it can be inferred from an-
ticompetitive conduct directed to achieving such price setting or ex-
clusion.49 The pregnant aspect of this approach, as so stated, was
that part of Lessig which was described as the exclusion of competi-
tors from a portion of the market, a phraseology broad enough to
encompass any seller's attempt to divert business away from its ri-
vals to itself. As applied to Lessig, that phrase described Tidewater's
attempt to sell exclusively to its own distributors and dealers.
Clearly, therefore, the Ninth Circuit's case law on attempt
needed clarification to remove lingering doubts that a seller's at-
tempts to sell to its own dealers, to integrate forward into distribu-
tion, or to divert business away from rivals to itself could not be
characterized as exclusionary and form the basis for a claim of at-
tempt to monopolize. Bushie clarified the law on forward integra-
tion. Hallmark described the conduct necessary to raise the double
inference as "predatory," but left the definition of that term wide
open. Later courts described the proof necessary to support the
double inference as proof of a section 1 Sherman Act violation or
proof of anticompetitive or predatory conduct.
48 See, e.g., Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 121 (9th Cir. 1972); Hallmark
Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932
(1974).
49 489 F.2d at 12.
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B. Conduct as Corroboration of Specific Intent
A second development emerged from the Ninth Circuit cases
grappling with Lessig's significance as a precedent governing at-
tempt to monopolize cases. Beginning with Hallmark in 1973, the
Ninth Circuit began to include the requirement that predatory or
anticompetitive behavior corroborate specific intent, at least where
specific intent is used as a basis for inferring dangerous probability
of success. 50 Hallmark, therefore, substantially mitigated the worst
dangers of Lessig. It is commonplace that shrewdly designed dis-
covery requests against many business firms may unearth memo-
randa, letters, and other documents cast in language which, in a
courtroom, can create a false impression of anticompetitive mo-
tives.5 1 Lessig's apparent expansionary approach to the attempt
clause was especially mischievous, so long as an attempt case could
be made out on evidence of intent alone and so long as that intent
could be established from such misleading sources. Hallmark im-
plicitly recognized this danger and sought to reduce it by requiring
corroboration of intent by evidence of behavior. Under Hallmark,
the definition of anticompetitive or predatory behavior again be-
came critical. Hallmark's weakness lay in its use of an open-ended
definition of predatory behavior.
C. The Behavior Requirement
The Hallmark court had no trouble establishing the require-
ment of behavior to corroborate specific intent. A plaintiff who
sought to make out an attempt case by the double inference
method would have to show predatory behavior or a section 1 viola-
tion. One could expect many cases to be based upon both a double
inference method of proof and independent evidence of specific in-
tent. Carrying over the requirement of showing predatory behavior
(or a section 1 violation) from the double inference cases to cases
involving independent proof of specific intent may not have ap-
peared as unduly constraining the proof of attempt cases by the
latter method. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit's expressed view that
evidence of specific intent was often difficult to obtain may have
reflected the court's growing skepticism about the reliability of pur-
ported evidence of intent. Such skepticism may have moved the
court to recognize the need for corroborating that evidence with
evidence of behavior.52
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW-AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 189-90 (1976).
52 In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014,
1028 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982), the court acknowledged that the
reason direct evidence of intent alone could not sustain a charge of attempt to monopolize
was because of the propensity of intent evidence to be ambiguous and misleading.
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The conduct which corroborated specific intent as well as the
conduct which gave rise to a double inference in Hallmark was de-
scribed as "predatory conduct directed to accomplishing the unlaw-
ful purpose." 53 Such a definition of the conduct requirement did
not close the open-endedness of the attempt offense created by Les-
sig. If the unlawful purpose could be the exclusion of competitors
from an appreciable part of the market, as both Hallmark and Lessig
suggested, then defining the conduct which supported an attempt
claim in instrumental terms related to that goal only transfers the
ambiguity surrounding the intent element to the definition of the
conduct. Although Hallmark included a requirement that the con-
duct had to be "predatory," that court did not provide any defini-
tion of predatory acts. The possibility that any unlawful or unfair
trade practice could be predatory received support in the court's
1976 opinion in Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc. ,54 where a newspaper's
efforts to misrepresent its circulation as larger than it was were
evaluated for predatoriness. The possibility thus remained that an
attempt offense could be established by evidence of substandard
business behavior designed to divert sales away from a rival in an
"appreciable" part of the market.
D. Section 1 as a Reference for Evaluating Behavior
In Gough v. Rossmoor Corp. ,55 the Ninth Circuit not only sharply
limited the expansionary language of the Greyhound case, but also
defined the kind of conduct which would give rise to an inference of
specific intent for purposes of the double inference method of
proof. While the Circuit's earlier decisions had indicated that con-
duct which violated section 1 would give rise to an inference of spe-
cific intent,56 Gough employed more enigmatic language in its use of
section 1 as a guide to the predatoriness of conduct. The court
refused to permit an inference of specific intent to be drawn from
the defendants' barring of Rosen (the independent carpet dealer)
from advertising in the development newspaper because it found
no indication that the captive carpet dealer intended to put Rosen
out of business. The court, however, went on to describe the kinds
of conduct which would raise such an inference:
While conduct which would, in the case of a conspiracy, amount
to a per se violation of section 1 would constitute an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade without proof of market or market power,
under the rule of reason market definition is required to estab-
lish a section 1 violation. . . .Thus, in the absence of proof of
53 489 F.2d at 12.
54 548 F.2d 795, 814 (9th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
55 585 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979).
56 See text following notes 21 and 34 supra.
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relevant market and market power, the plaintiff must prove
either predatory conduct or a per se violation of section 1 to
prove an attempt to monopolize.5 7
In Gough, the court was straining to say that section 1 is a guide to
the type of conduct which must be shown to establish a violation of
the attempt clause. 58 Because the establishment of a relevant mar-
ket is generally required in section 1 cases as a means of demon-
strating an adverse impact on competition in the market, proof of a
relevant market is required in a section 2 attempt case as a means of
demonstrating the defendant's market power (and hence the dan-
gerous probability of its successful monopolization). In stating all
this, the court was restricting the scope of the double inference
method of proving an attempt.
According to the court, a plaintiff in an attempt case could use
a double inference to dispense with proof of a relevant market and
of market power when he proved that the defendant had engaged
in certain kinds of conduct which the court referred to as preda-
tory.5 9 That was nothing new; the Ninth Circuit had been saying as
much at least since Hallmark in 1973. What was new in Gough was
that the court used the section 1 reasonableness standard as a crite-
57 585 F.2d at 390. The passage is not a model of clarity. If full grammatical effect
were given to the court's punctuation, this passage seems to say that conduct which would
constitute a per se violation of § 1 if performed pursuant to a conspiracy would, if per-
formed unilaterally, constitute the basis for proof of an attempt to monopolize through the
double inference method of proof.
Such a reading of the court's language would surely be overly literalistic. The catego-
ries of offenses illegal per se under § I are illegal because they are conspiratorial. These
categories would be radically open-ended if translated into analogous categories of unlaw-
ful unilateral behavior. A refusal to deal used for purposes of enforcing vertical price fixing,
for example, is lawful when performed unilaterally, but is illegal per se when performed
pursuant to an agreement. Compare United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)
with Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979). See also Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). The court could not have intended to
carry over the illegal per se categories of conspiratorial behavior under § 1 into corre-
sponding categories of unilateral behavior under § 2. Moreover, this panel of the Ninth
Circuit was writing the quoted language as it was in the process of correcting another
panel's overly expansionistic Greyhound opinion. Greyhound was premised on the view that a
nonexpansionistic interpretation of the attempt clause would make it redundant. But if
Cough were "narrowing" the attempt clause to cover unilaterally performed behavior which
would be illegal under § I if conspiratorially performed, then § 1 would become redun-
danti Concerted action would become unimportant because the same conduct which was
illegal under § 1 with a conspiracy would be illegal under the § 2 attempt clause without a
conspiracy.
58 See, e.g., California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 737 (9th Cir.
1979) (articulating the same point):
Additionally, "[s]ection I also prohibits 'contracts' that restrain trade," .... and
since individual actions may violate § 2, no contractual agreement is required.
Nonetheless, under § 2 attempt-as with § 2 monopolization-individual conduct
is measured against the same "reasonableness" standard governing concerted and
contractual activity under § 1.
59 585 F.2d at 390.
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rion for predatoriness. This was the beginning of a new effort to
link predatoriness with actual or expected market effects. Con-
versely, it was also a backhanded way of saying that mere unethical
behavior by a firm without market power could not give rise to an
inference of specific intent.60 This negative statement was a signifi-
cant contribution to the Ninth Circuit's case law on attempt. The
court also made a more problematic affirmative statement: Behav-
ior will give rise to an inference of specific intent when it is inher-
ently likely to produce an anticompetitive effect on the market. 61
That statement is troublesome because its meaning is unclear and
perhaps unclarifiable.
Except on a highly abstract level, the court never bothered to
ask what type of behavior by a firm without market power could be
inherently anticompetitive. It offered no concrete illustrations of
the kind of behavior it had in mind. The court referred to per se
violations of section 1 as conduct which would be taken to be an-
ticompetitive without proof of a relevant market or an assessment
of market effects. The court then assumed that an analogous class
of unilateral conduct existed which could properly be taken as in-
herently anticompetitive without evaluating the effects of that con-
duct on the market.
Other decisions of the Ninth Circuit confirm this interpreta-
tion. In Hunt- Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc. ,62 the court again
referred to this behavior in abstract terms: "In some cases of
clearly exclusionary conduct, the conduct itself, along with the ex-
clusionary intent that can be inferred from it, poses such a danger
to competition that it may be condemned regardless of the market
power of the actor." 63 Similar language appeared in A.H. Cox & Co.
v. Star Machinery Co. 64 and, even before Gough was decided, inJanich
Brothers, Inc. v. American Distilling Co. 65
The court wrapped itself in a contradiction in that part of the
Gough opinion where it affirmatively asserted that predatory or an-
ticompetitive behavior could give rise to an inference of specific in-
60 There had been a danger that the Ninth Circuit would fall into the trap of allowing
behavior that was merely unfair or unethical to give rise to an inference of specific intent.
That would have created a doctrine under the attempt clause analogous to the so-called
Pick-Barth rule. Under the Pick-Barth rule, a conspiracy to injure a business firm by unfair
means was said to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. See Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell
Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932). The Ninth Circuit
rejected a per se treatment of unfair competitive practices in A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Ma-
chinery Co., 653 F.2d 1302, 1308 (9th Cir. 1981).
61 This is the assumption underlying the court's ruling that an attempt case can be
established by proof of "predatory conduct or a per se violation of § I." 585 F.2d at 390.
62 627 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981).
63 Id. at 925.
64 653 F.2d 1302, 1308 (9th Cir. 1981).
65 570 F.2d 848, 854 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 829 (1978).
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tent (and hence to the attempt offense) in the absence of market
power. By using section 1 as a guide, the court adopted a market-
oriented criterion for evaluating the predatoriness of a firm's be-
havior. Yet the court also asserted, unwisely, that some unilateral
conduct was inherently predatory, regardless of the actor's market
power. The court gave no examples of such inherently predatory
conduct. Section 1, which the court looked to for guidance, gives
no indication as to what kind of unilateral conduct engaged in by an
actor without market power would be anticompetitive. Indeed, sec-
tion 1 analysis suggests that the only kind of unilateral conduct
which could be anticompetitive would be conduct engaged in by an
actor possessing market power.66
E. Market Power as a Factor in Evaluating Conduct
The Ninth Circuit had previously expressed the view that the
presence or absence of market power was an important factor in
evaluating a firm's behavior under the attempt clause. In its 1977
decision inJanich Brothers, Inc. v. American Distilling Co. ,67 for exam-
ple, the court cautioned the trial court that the intent which may be
inferred from conduct will depend upon the circumstances in which
the conduct occurs, and that market power is a highly relevant cir-
cumstance: "[T]he same aggressive conduct which is seen only as a
reaction to competition by a small firm may suggest intent to mo-
nopolize where carried out by a firm with a significant market
power." 68 Yet this advice was given where the court was discussing
the double inference method of proof, a method used to avoid
proof of market power. The Ninth Circuit's advice to the trial court
inJanich thus was that, most of the time, specific intent can be in-
ferred from conduct only when that conduct is performed by a firm
with market power. In short, the plaintiff will generally have to
prove the relevant market and the defendant's power within that
market. The only exception is when the defendant has engaged in
the kind of conduct (described above in the quoted passages from
Gough and Hunt-Wesson Foods) which is inherently anticompetitive.
The Janich court thus explicitly limited the situations in which an
inference of intent from conduct would be permissible. In the ab-
sence of market power, that inference could be drawn only from
conduct which was inherently anticompetitive.
66 This is suggested by § l's concerted action requirement. Concerted action is more
dangerous than unilateral behavior because it unites the power of several firms and thus
may create the potential for affecting the conditions of competition in the general market.
See Justice Harlan's analysis in his dissenting opinion in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145, 160-61 (1968).
67 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
68 Id. at 854 n.4.
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Janich differs from the other cases discussed so far because the
claims of attempt to monopolize involved alleged predatory pric-
ing. When the Janich court referred to behavior which was inher-
ently anticompetitive (or in the court's words, "clearly threatening
to competition or clearly exclusionary"), 69 it had at its disposal a
seminal analysis of predatory pricing which had been published two
years earlier and which the Ninth Circuit had already employed in
the Hanson v. Shell Oil Co. 70 decision of the preceding year.
IV. The Predatory Pricing Cases
In 1975 the Harvard Law Review published Predatory Pricing and
Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 71 by Professors
Philip Areeda and Donald Turner. The article proposed an ap-
proach towards the evaluation of predatory pricing claims based
upon economic analysis: prices challenged as predatory would be
evaluated under a marginal cost or average variable cost test.
Prices above marginal cost should be deemed nonpredatory, be-
cause a firm could not drive any equally efficient rival from the mar-
ket by selling at or above marginal cost. Conversely, prices below
marginal cost should be deemed predatory because there is no ap-
parent legitimate short-run goal which is attainable by such pricing.
Since marginal cost is difficult or impossible to discover, average
variable cost should be used as a surrogate for marginal cost in ap-
plying the marginal-cost criterion. 72 The Areeda-Turner proposal
has been endorsed with various qualifications in almost every
circuit.73
Although the Fifth Circuit first used the Areeda-Turner propo-
sal in a Robinson-Patman context shortly after the publication of
69 Id. at 854 n.3.
70 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
71 Areeda & Turner, supra note 14. The article has spawned an extensive literature; see
D. GIFFORD & L. RASKIND, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 406 n.** (1983).
See also 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 150-94 (1978).
72 Areeda & Turner, supra note 14, at 716-18.
73 D.E. Rogers Assoc. v. Gardner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431, 1437, 1439 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984); SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275
(8th Cir. 1981); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1017 (1982); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
668 F.2d 1014, 1041 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Northeastern Tel. Co.
v. A.T.&T. Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982); Chillicothe
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1980); Pacific Eng. &
Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977);
International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976). In MCI Communications Corp. v. A.T.&T. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1120 n.55 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983), the Seventh Circuit applied a long-
run incremental cost test to pricing in the capital-intensive telecommunications industry
while reaffirming the use of the Areeda-Turner test generally.
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the article in 1975,74 the Ninth Circuit followed suit in the following
year. In Hanson v. Shell Oil Co. ,75 the Ninth Circuit employed that
test to uphold a directed verdict for the defendant on an attempt to
monopolize claim. In Hanson, the court ruled that because the
plaintiff gasoline dealer had introduced no evidence that the de-
fendant oil company had been selling its products below marginal
or average variable cost, it was not entitled to reach a jury on a
claim of attempt to monopolize predicated on a claim of predatory
pricing.76 Hanson was followed by Janich Brothers, Inc. v. American
Distilling Co. 77 in 1977, California Computer Products, Inc. v. IBM
Corp. 7 8 in 1979, and qualified in William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v.
ITT Continental Baking Co.79 in 1981. Later cases have confirmed the
basic Inglis approach.8 0
The Ninth Circuit's endorsement of the Areeda-Turner pro-
posals in Hanson effectively began the process of destroying much
of Lessig's remaining vitality. The Hanson decision also undercut
the premises on which the court's later decision in Greyhound rested.
The Areeda-Turner proposals rested upon an intellectual approach
to antitrust analysis which differed vastly from the approach which
underlay both Lessig and Greyhound. Although this conflict was not
recognized at the time and has never been explicitly acknowledged
by the Ninth Circuit, the fact remains that the court made a major
break with its past history in deciding Hanson.
The Areeda-Turner proposals are analytical tools devised to
assist judges in disposing of nonmeritorious predatory pricing
claims prior to trial. Their main proposal is the use of average vari-
able cost as a bright line separating predatory from nonpredatory
pricing. They make use of a number of simplifying assumptions
and concessions to practicality in devising their average variable
cost criterion. Thus, average variable cost is used as the measure of
lawful pricing because the more accurate marginal cost is impossi-
ble to calculate in any given case. Additionally, fixed costs are dis-
tinguished from variable costs by an Areeda-Turner fiat: they name
74 International Air Indus. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
75 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
76 Id. at 1358.
77 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
78 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979).
79 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
80 See Marsann Co. v. Brammall Co., 788 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1986); Airweld, Inc. v.
Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184, 1192-94 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1184 (1985);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
955 (1983); Zoslaw v. MCA Dist. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 988 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1085 (1983).
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several fixed costs and define the remainder as variable.8' This is
done to make the definition of variable costs a question of law
which can be disposed of by the court on a motion for summary
judgment.
Despite these simplifications, the Areeda-Turner proposals
rest upon a base of microeconomic theory and also describe his-
toric antitrust concerns. Thus, Areeda and Turner developed their
proposed test for predatory pricing from an analysis of the presup-
positions of predatory pricing behavior. Predatory pricing, at the
time that Areeda and Turner wrote their article, was, by common
consent, pricing unduly low in order to drive rivals from the market
or to punish them for failing to cooperate in noncompetitive pric-
ing.8 2 The elements which distinguished predatory from nonpreda-
tory pricing, therefore, were its inappropriately low level and its
objective of inflicting injury upon rivals other than through normal
competitive interaction.
Areeda and Turner first reasoned that since the universally ac-
cepted goal of competition included pricing at marginal cost and
the replacement of inefficient with efficient firms, any firm which
priced at or above its own marginal cost could not drive any more
efficient rival out of the market.8 3 A marginal cost test of predatory
pricing, therefore, would legitimize pricing which furthered com-
petitive market goals.
Second, Areeda and Turner articulated the full context of
predatory pricing as a basis for developing the analysis giving rise
to their proposals. A predator incurs present losses in order to de-
velop a future market position in which it can earn supracompeti-
tive profits. Thus, its objective is to change a competitive market
into a monopolistic or an oligopolistic one. Alternatively, it may be
disciplining a recalcitrant rival which refuses to observe an oligo-
polistic price. In the latter case, the predator's present losses are
incurred to maintain a system of oligopolistic pricing. In all cases,
the predator intends to recoup its present losses from future mo-
nopoly or oligopoly prices. Without the expectation of such re-
coupment from future monopoly or oligopoly revenues, predatory
pricing (in the sense of pricing below marginal cost) would make no
81 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 173-74 (1978). But cf Areeda & Turner,
supra note 14, at 720.
82 The contemporary literature had not reached a consensus on a workable legal stan-
dard for separating the plausibly meritorious from the unmeritorious claims of predatory
pricing. See Koller, The iyth of Predatory Picing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REV. 105 (1971); Koller, On the Definition of Predatoty Pricing, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 329, 331-
32 (1975); Yamey, Predatory Pice Cutting: Notes and Comntents, 15 J. L. & ECON. 129, 133
(1972); Gifford, Promotional Price-Cutting and Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patnian Act, 1976 Wis.
L. REV. 1045, 1048.
83 Areeda & Turner, supra note 14, at 709-12.
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sense at all. 84
Areeda and Turner were not saying anything new when they
pointed out that below marginal cost pricing would be disastrous
for a firm unless those prices produced a future monopoly from
which the firm could recoup its earlier losses. The necessity for
such recoupment had always been understood in a general way.
The legislative history of section 2 of the Clayton Act describes a
pattern of predatory pricing in which Congress believed the old
Standard Oil Company had engaged.85 The description includes
reimbursement for the losses which the Company incurred during
the periods of predatory pricing. Moreover, in the years preceding
the Areeda and Turner article, economists had been carrying on a
lively debate in the scholarly journals about whether, in view of the
limited circumstances in which the losses produced by below margi-
nal cost prices could be recouped, predatory pricing ever actually
occurred.8 6
In developing proposals designed for judicial application, how-
ever, Areeda and Turner tied their proposed average variable cost
criterion to the dynamics of predatory behavior with a clarity which
the bench and bar could not escape. Although their proposal fo-
cused upon a measure of lawfulness for present prices which could
be easily applied in litigation, their analysis focused upon the entire
predatory scenario: the present behavior of the predator in relation
to the predator's future goals. Their analysis-just because of its
practical usefulness-helped to educate the legal profession about
the full dynamics of predatory pricing: how present conduct had to
be evaluated in the light of a future goal. Predatory pricing was not
rational behavior unless the predator expected the losses which it
imposed upon its rivals to bring about a restructuring of the market
from a more-or-less competitive market to a monopolistic one.
This recognition and analysis of the defendant's anticompeti-
tive goal is what was missing from the Ninth Circuit's Lessig opinion.
Nowhere did the court focus upon a restriction of competition in an
economically meaningful market. Tidewater's restrictive conduct
was confined to the marketing of its own brand of product which
was estimated to encompass five percent of the actual gasoline
market.
In the immediate post-Hanson period, a panel of the Ninth Cir-
84 Id. at 698.
85 See Committee on theJudiciary, Antitrust Legislation, H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1914).
86 Yamey, supra note 82, at 129; Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder
Trust, 13 J. L. & EcON. 223 (1970); Telser, Abusive Trade Practices: An Economic Analysis, 30
LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 488, 494-96 (1965); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil
(N.J.) Case, IJ. L. & EcON. 137 (1958).
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cuit stated in Greyhound that the attempt offense should be inter-
preted expansively because otherwise anticompetitive behavior by a
single firm lacking a large market share would not be remediable
under the antitrust laws. Yet that court failed to subject its con-
cerns to any analysis. Of what kind of anticompetitive conduct is a
firm with a small market share capable? Are the anticompetitive
consequences present or future ones? It is exceedingly difficult for
a single firm with a small market share to exert any significant an-
ticompetitive impact on the market as a whole. Certainly it could
not do anything with its various intrabrand restrictions which it
could not lawfully do as a fully integrated seller. Tidewater, as a
fully integrated seller with only five percent of the market, was con-
strained by that market. Even its price fixing activities were con-
fined to its own brand. Unless it was part of a broader horizontal
conspiracy, Tidewater could command, at most, only a price pre-
mium for its products which reflected consumer preference for its
brand. It possessed no power to extract more than such a brand
preference premium over the general market price.
Similarly, the court in Greyhound expressly assumed, for the
purpose of its attempt analysis, that IBM was not dangerously close
to monopolizing the market for computer leases. It is clear from
the court's opinion that it was inferring dangerous probability, or
the lack thereof, from the defendant's market share. Yet, as in Les-
sig, the court never analyzed the anticompetitive impact that IBM's
behavior produced or was designed to produce in the general mar-
ket. Greyhound was complaining of IBM's advantages in the com-
puter leasing market which were derived entirely from IBM's
control over the machines which it manufactured. IBM's advan-
tages were those which any manufacturer has when competing with
its customers for the resale or lease of its products. If IBM had
really wanted a monopoly of leasing, it could have refused to sell to
leasing companies and leased directly to those lease customers who
wanted IBM machines. That route would have avoided all or most
of the antitrust difficulties with which it had to deal. Yet, as in Les-
sig, the court failed to inquire into the supposed anticompetitive
consequences of the defendant's behavior. If the court had seri-
ously inquired and asked the questions suggested above, it could
not have so easily found the gap in the Sherman Act. Had the court
in Lessig and Greyhound asked how Tidewater's or IBM's behavior
would affect the general market in which its products were sold, the
court would have gained a better insight into the way the various
provisions of the Sherman Act should interrelate.
The significant element in the court's predatory pricing analy-
sis in Hanson was the relating of the defendant's present behavior to
a likely or plausible future goal. That relationship helped to iden-
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tify the antitrust significance of the behavior. If the defendant's be-
havior consisted of charging prices for its products which were at or
above marginal cost, those prices enriched the defendant and could
not bring about a result inconsistent with a competitive market.
The court did not have to seek a goal beyond the short-run profits
which those prices produced. If, however, the defendant's behavior
consisted of charging prices below its marginal cost, it subjected
itself to injury in the short-run. Such behavior would necessarily be
designed to achieve some longer term goal, such as the restructur-
ing of the market into a monopoly or oligopoly.
Justice Holmes employed an analogous approach in Swift & Co.
v. United States.87 In that case, Justice Holmes insisted upon intent
as an essential element in the attempt offense. The intent of which
he spoke was the "intent to bring it [a monopoly] to pass,"88 i.e., an
intent to change the present state of affairs in which the defendant
has no monopoly into a future state of affairs in which the defend-
ant does possess a monopoly. Justice Holmes thus used intent as a
bridge by which a likely future state would be employed to evaluate
the defendant's behavior in the present.
In theory, the specific intent traditionally used in attempt cases
can play such a bridging role: the ambiguity of the defendant's
present behavior can be resolved if the defendant's goal is revealed.
That is why a so-called "specific intent" is a required element in an
attempt offense, but only a "general intent," or intent to do the act,
is required for the completed offense of monopolization. In an at-
tempt case, the lawfulness of the defendant's actions depend upon
whether they are a means to an unlawful end. The defendant's goal
is, therefore, essential in assessing the significance of its behavior.
In both Lessig and Greyhound, the Ninth Circuit neglected the
relationship between the instrumental nature of present behavior
and the goal to which it is directed. If the present behavior does not
itself impose a significant restraint upon the general market, then
its lawfulness should depend upon whether it is an instrument for
the imposition of such a restraint, even at a later time.
V. The Inglis Synthesis
A. The Decision
In 1981 the Ninth Circuit decided William Inglis & Sons Baking
Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.89 In that case, a small bakery (Ing-
lis) which had ceased production claimed that Continental had
driven it out of business by predatory pricing of private label bread.
87 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
88 Id. at 396.
89 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982).
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Inglis cast its antitrust claims both as attempts to monopolize under
the Sherman Act and as primary-line price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act. Inglis won a jury verdict, but the district
court set that judgment aside.90 On review, the Ninth Circuit,
through Judge Sneed, synthesized that Circuit's law governing at-
tempts to monopolize.
Inglis drew from Hanson andJanich to define predatory pricing:
"'Pricing is predatory only where the firm foregoes short-term
profits in order to develop a market position such that the firm can
later raise prices and recoup lost profits .. ' "91 The Inglis court
repeatedly emphasized that the objective of predatory pricing was
the creation of this future market position. Additionally, where the
plaintiff's case is inferred from the defendant's conduct, the mo-
nopoly objective attributed to the defendant has to be reasonably
attainable by the defendant from its present market position. The
court's focus was on "what a rational firm would have expected its
prices to accomplish." 92 Moreover, that future monopolistic mar-
ket goal was related to the defendant's present pricing behavior in a
precise way because the defendant rationally must be able to expect
that its present conduct will bring it the market position to recoup
present losses. Thus, the defendant's present market position must
be such that it can be transformed into a position which can earn
monopoly profits in the future. The transformation of the market
must also occur within a time frame in which the discounted pres-
ent value of the future monopoly gains exceed the present losses
incurred by the defendant.
Most of the court's analysis in Inglis had been contained in
Hanson and Janich. Additionally, Janich, as well as Inglis, had re-
viewed the standards governing predatory pricing in the context of
an overall review of the Circuit's law on attempt to monopolize.
For several reasons, however, Inglis is best viewed as the new syn-
thesis of Ninth Circuit attempt to monopolize law. First, the court's
review of the prior case law and its various threads was more thor-
ough in Inglis. Second, there is more evident judicial support
within the Circuit for holding plaintiffs to Inglis' carefully articu-
lated standards.93 Third, Inglis provided a defensible framework
90 Id. at 1024.
91 Id. at 1031 (quotingJanich, 570 F.2d at 856; Hanson, 541 F.2d at 1358).
92 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1034.
93 Judge Peck dissented from the Inglis majority's ruling that pricing below average
variable cost is sufficient to establish a prima facie attempt to monopolize case by use of the
double-inference method of proof. Judge Wallace dissented from the decision of the full
court not to rehear en banc. He objected to the Inglis majority opinion on the ground that
the use of the average variable cost criterion merely to shift the burden of proof on preda-
tion permitted the plaintiffs to reach the jury on inadequate evidence. In short, a majority
of the full court did not wish to rehear Inglis, and the two judges who publicly disagreed
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for incorporating the Circuit's previously paradoxical statements
that an attempt to monopolize case could be built upon inherently
anticompetitive conduct unilaterally performed by a defendant
without market power. Finally, the Inglis framework may ultimately
give rise to further reform.
Inglis drew heavily from Areeda and Turner, as had Hanson and
Janich. The court followed the recommendation of those authors,
as well as its own prior decisions in Hanson and Janich, by using a
marginal cost approach to the evaluation of predatory pricing as
well as by accepting average variable cost as a practical surrogate
for marginal cost. Inglis struck out on new ground, however, in two
important respects. Inglis used average variable cost as a standard
for allocating the burden of proof, and it explicitly rejected the
rigid definitions of fixed and variable costs proposed by Areeda and
Turner in favor of a more economic definition. (The two earlier
cases had employed economic definitions without discussion.)
Each of these rulings in Inglis is controversial.
B. The Burden of Proof Ruling
Inglis' burden of proof ruling serves a functional role in the
reform of the Ninth Circuit's attempt to monopolize law. The court
described the burdens of the parties as follows: The plaintiff must
prove that the defendant's pricing was predatory where the prices
are above average variable cost but below average total cost. If the
plaintiff can prove that the defendant's prices were below average
variable costs, he has established a prima facie case of predatory
pricing. The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove that its
prices were justified. 94
By explicitly denoting average variable cost as the criterion for
allocating the burdens of the parties, the court was casting a new
light upon its own earlier statements that, even in the absence of
proof of market power, conduct which was "predatory or anticom-
petitive" could give rise to an inference of specific intent (and, us-
ing the double inference approach, to dangerous probability and
then to attempt). Read in the light of a burden of proof allocation,
the court's earlier references to conduct which was so inherendy
with the opinion did so on the ground that its standards were too tolerant of plaintiffs with
weak cases.
94 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1035-36. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the technique
of allocating the burden of proof for disposing of predatory pricing claims in which the
defendant's prices exceeded average total cost. Unwilling to rule that a plaintiff could in no
circumstances prove predatoriness in a defendant's above average total cost pricing, the
Ninth Circuit left open the possibility that a plaintiff could make out such a case, but re-
quired proof by "clear and convincing evidence." Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM
Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983). See also Drinkwine v.
Federated Pub., Inc. 780 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1523 (1986).
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anticompetitive as to give rise to an inference of specific intent to
monopolize in the absence of market power were not statements
that a firm without market power could act anticompetitively.
Rather, they were statements that in the case of certain kinds of
conduct, the burden on the issue of market power and other related
matters is best placed on the defendant.
Even here Inglis was not stating a new doctrine. Other Ninth
Circuit cases had indicated that although "dangerous probability of
success" was not an essential element of the plaintiff's case, it was
nonetheless a relevant matter on which evidence could be intro-
duced.9 5 These decisions suggested that the defendant could bring
to bear evidence showing its lack of market power and hence its
inability to succeed in any attempt to monopolize. Yet Inglis set
forth the burden of proof allocation in a coherent, precise and eas-
ily understandable way: Under Inglis, the required proof was re-
lated to effects upon the market structure. If the plaintiff proves
that the defendant sold below average variable cost, then the de-
fendant must prove that its prices were not predatory as the court
had defined that term, i.e., as involving the sacrifice of present reve-
nues for an anticipated future monopoly gain. Inglis thus made an
exploration of the market structure and the defendant's place
within the market a sine qua non of the proof in an attempt case. If,
for example, there were no significant barriers to entry into the
market in which the defendant was operating, then the defendant
could never expect to "reap the benefits of monopoly power" in the
future. And hence an evaluation of its present behavior as preda-
tory would be ill-founded.
Under Inglis, pricing below average variable cost was the para-
digmatic case of presumptively predatory behavior. Inglis implicitly
recognized that such pricing is not inherently anticompetitive in the
sense that a firm without market power could affect the general
market by that conduct. Rather, Inglis, in effect, treats such pricing
as sufficiently associated with predatory behavior to require the de-
fendant to show that the pricing is not in fact predatory. As shown
below, this analysis is broad enough to provide guidance in evaluat-
ing nonprice behavior alleged to be predatory.
C. The Reconciliation of the Cases Applying the "Double Inference"
Method of Proof
As a result of the Inglis decision, the prior confusing Ninth Cir-
cuit case law could now be reconciled with an intellectually plausi-
95 Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 1980); Hall-
mark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932
(1974).
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ble approach to the attempt offense. The "double inference,"
which led from anticompetitive behavior to the establishment of the
attempt offense, could rest on pricing which fell below average vari-
able cost or upon nonpricing behavior which possessed the same
potential to confer monopoly power on the defendant by bringing
about a structural change in the market. But market power was not
irrelevant; indeed, it was always relevant. Unless the defendant
priced below its average variable cost or engaged in nonpricing be-
havior of a kind which posed similar dangers to the market struc-
ture, the plaintiff would have to prove the defendant's market
power. If the plaintiff did prove such threatening conduct, then the
defendant would have to prove that its behavior was not predatory
by proving, inter alia, that it lacked market power.
Inglis confirmed earlier rulings that a plaintiff must introduce
evidence of the defendant's conduct to establish a prima facie case
of attempt to monopolize, whether or not the plaintiff possessed
direct evidence of the defendant's intent. Inglis, however, made ex-
plicit what earlier courts had said only by implication: that evidence
of conduct is required to corroborate direct evidence of intent be-
cause the latter is often ambiguous and misleading.96 Whereas the
focus of the textual part of the Lessig opinion was upon intent, the
Inglis opinion provides a healthy corrective focusing upon the dan-
gerously misleading nature of much evidence of intent.
D. Economic Evidence of Fixed and Variable Costs: The Ramifications
In their attempt to provide courts with an easily usable tool
with which to dispose of unmeritorious predatory pricing claims on
motion for summary judgment, Areeda and Turner proposed that
all costs be considered variable except capital costs on land, plant
and equipment, property taxes and other taxes unaffected by out-
put, and depreciation on the plant.97 Inglis rejected this approach
in favor of one which determines on a case-by-case basis what costs
actually fluctuate with output. The disadvantage of the Inglis ap-
proach, of course, is that the determination of what costs are varia-
ble and what costs are fixed becomes a question of fact. Because
questions of fact are for the jury, it becomes more difficult for the
court to use the average variable cost test in ruling upon a defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment.
The Inglis formulation does, however, have some advantages.
First, in an effort to provide a fixed definition of variable costs,
96 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1028. On this point, see the later decision of the Ninth Circuit in
Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1184
(1985). Whether these safeguards have been undermined by Syufy Enter. v. American Mul-
ticinema, Inc., 783 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1986), is unclear.
97 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 173 (1978).
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Areeda and Turner made many more costs variable than those
which actually vary with output. General overhead, under the
Areeda and Turner formulation, is a variable cost. In an industry in
which plant and equipment are not large proportions of total cost,
the method of cost determination advocated by Areeda and Turner
overstates the predatory threshold, and would thereby penalize
pricing which, under their own marginal cost rationale, ought to be
characterized as pro-competitive. By rejecting this cost-determina-
tion aspect of Areeda and Turner, therefore, the Ninth Circuit in
Inglis opted for a more market sensitive approach to the attempt
offense. This choice thus reinforced the other aspects of that opin-
ion which made market analysis an integral part of an attempt case.
Second, Inglis' rejection of Areeda and Turner's rigid defini-
tion of variable costs in favor of an economic definition of those
costs helped to make the Inglis opinion a broad restatement of the
law on attempt to monopolize. Had the court employed the Areeda
and Turner definitions of variable costs, Inglis would have been de-
cided upon criteria which were specific to the predatory pricing
context. Because Inglis used economic definitions of variable costs,
it defined predatory behavior in economically meaningful terms.
Inglis, therefore, could speak to the law of attempt to monopolize
generally, including attempt cases involving behavior other than
pricing. The result is that Inglis has provided a framework for as-
sessing all attempt to monopolize claims, including those based
upon claims of improper pricing and those based upon claims of
improper nonprice behavior. Accordingly, under Inglis, attempt
claims involving nonprice behavior should be evaluated by the
same market-oriented test as is used in the predatory pricing
cases.98
Finally, in making the determination of what costs are variable,
a question of fact may not destroy the usefulness of the average
variable cost test as a summary judgment tool in the many cases in
which there is no serious dispute as to whether certain identified
costs do or do not vary with output.99 In most cases, it will be clear
98 The suggestion is that nonprice behavior must be nonprofit-maximizing in the short
run and directed towards the defendant's acquisition of monopoly power in the market in
order for the behavior to constitute evidence of specific intent. This general approach (of
analogizing nonprice behavior to price behavior) for purposes of attempt to monopolize
analysis was foreshadowed in that part of California Computer which dealt with design
changes in the defendant's product. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp.,
613 F.2d 727, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Airweld, 742 F.2d at 1192 (no intent "to
interfere with the competitive process"); Supermarket of Homes Inc. v. San Fernando Val-
ley Bd. of Realators, 786 F.2d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1986) (conduct which is nonexclusion-
ary for monopolization clause cannot be "predatory" for attempt clause).
99 Recently, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its economic approach to defining variable
costs. In Marsann Co. v. Brammall, Inc., 788 F.2d 611, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1986), the court
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that no direct relationship exists between output and costs such as
legal costs, accounting costs, administrative costs, many insurance
costs, utility costs, and much of the payroll costs. If, as will be
likely, the plaintiff will have no evidence of any such connection, the
average variable cost criterion will remain useful for the judiciary in
granting motions for summary judgment.
VI. Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit has traveled far since its 1964 decision in
Lessig, where it sought to broaden the sweep of the attempt to mo-
nopolize offense. Although it reaffirmed a broad construction of
the attempt clause as recently as its Greyhound decision of 1977, that
approach is now in full retreat. The court was never able to articu-
late a defensible rationale for its various efforts to expand the scope
of the attempt clause, and as a result, it floundered. Its efforts to
expand the scope of the attempt clause illustrate the limitations of
the judicial process. The Ninth Circuit undertook a task for which,
as an institution, it lacked the background and the competence to
bring to a successful completion. 00 It was able to recover its way
by following the theoretical analysis of predatory pricing provided
by Professors Areeda and Turner, and by weaving that analysis into
a new synthesis of the law of attempt.
moved the definition of average variable costs as close as practicable to marginal costs, thus
moving the legal test of predatoriness closer to the point identified by economic theory.
100 Cf. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 423 (1978). Judge Bork observed that be-
cause federal judges are generalists, the leads in theoretical analysis must generally come
from outside the courts themselves. In both Lessig and Greyhound, the Ninth Circuit acted
without an adequate theoretical framework to guide it.
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